This study examines the share price reaction that occurs when shares are added to or deleted from the NZSE 10 and NZSE 40, which are the two leading indices that apply to the New Zealand sharemarket. It used Eventus event study software to analyse changes to the indices during the period January 1994 to December 1998. Previous studies in other markets have shown abnormal returns are available at the date when index changes become effective, pointing to an exploitable market inefficiency. The results of this study show than the index effect is absent for the NZSE 10 and for shares that are added to the NZSE 40. Shares that are deleted from the NZSE 40 do show statistically significant negative abnormal returns.
Introduction
There is substantial evidence that fund managers that actively manage their investment portfolios are unable to outperform sharemarket indices that act as benchmarks for the securities found in their portfolios. This has resulted in the emergence of index based funds which charge lower fees and adopt a strategy of holding a portfolio that exactly matches the relevant index. In New Zealand the first of these funds was the TeNZ fund launched by the New Zealand Stock exchange in April 1997. This fund, which matched the NZSE 10 index, has assets of $150 million at the present time. Since that date a number of other similar passive funds have been launched. Most of these seek to match the NZSE 40, although some like the Mid Cap Index Fund match the 30 shares in the NZSE 40 not represented in the NZSE 10. When there is any change to the composition of the relevant index these funds must buy and sell shares so that they continue to match the index. This alters the demand for these shares, and studies to date have indicated that a price reaction can be expected to result.
Any price effect will not only result from the activities of indexed funds as one can expect all fund managers investing in a particular market make strategic investment decisions based on changes to the index. Funds are judged by their performance relative to indices. Where a share found in the index is not found in a portfolio in proportion to its importance in the relevant index, then the mismatch will create a potential difference in performance between the fund and the index. Fund managers will therefore tend to hold the index, and under or overweight certain shares in order to attempt to outperform the index. This will create an incentive to buy shares entering the index and sell them as they leave in a similar way to the managers of passive funds. In the New Zealand market the size of passive funds, which total about 0.5 percent of market capitalisation do not on their own seem large enough to cause substantial abnormal returns.
If abnormal returns can be shown to occur in the period between when a change to the index is announced and its effective date then this is evidence that the market is not exhibiting semi-strong efficiency and provides an opportunity for speculators to profit. This study was designed to determine if abnormal returns could be obtained on the New Zealand sharemarket in the manner that has been demonstrated on other sharemarkets.
Literature Review
The effect of changes to the composition of an index has been studied quite extensively in the US. Shleifer (1986) was one of the first to investigate the index effect, finding an abnormal price increase of 2.79 percent on the day following the announcement of an addition to the S&P 500 during the period 1976 to 1983. Harris and Gurel (1986) used a similar sample and showed a 3.13 abnormal return resulting from additions to the S&P 500. Beneish and Whaley (1996) studied the effect resulting from the 1989 change whereby notifications of additions to and deletions from the S&P 500 were changed from the day of the change to 5 days prior to the change. They found that the new policy resulted in an increase in the price reaction, but that the price reaction now reversed after the stock was included in the index. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) also reported positive returns averaging 3.8 percent from additions to the index and negative returns for shares deleted from the index. Beneish and Whaley (1997) conclude that the announcement practice of giving prior notice results in speculators buying shares ahead of their acquisition by S&P 500 index funds and then selling them at a profit following the price reaction.
The US Indices, the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), are revised on an ongoing basis. Other indices are revised annually. Chung and Kryzanowski (1988) sought to find out if the Canadian TSE 300, which is revised annual with a longer advance notice period, would produce differing results. They theorised that because the number of changes were larger the need for rebalancing would be more urgent as the tracking error resulting from not rebalancing the portfolio would be potentially much larger. The larger announcement window was shown to compensate for the greater number of changes, and they found smaller abnormal returns than found in the US studies and that price effects were transitory. No studies outside the US and Canada were found in the literature, although there is ample anecdotal evidence that speculating on the index effect is common in other markets. Stuza (1988) reports that the index effect does not result in a one off spike as firms added to the index still had abnormal returns of 5.9 percent four weeks after inclusion. The evidence on the permanence of the price reaction is mixed as while Beneish and Whaley (1996) , Edminster, Graham and Pirie (1994) and Shleifer (1986) find continuing abnormal returns, Harris and Gurel (1986) find that any increase is largely reversed after two weeks and Chung and Kryzanowski (1988) also find that the effect reverses. Beneish and Whaley (1996) report that arbitrageurs are active in the market, buying shares on the announcement date in order to sell them to the indexed funds who cannot buy shares ahead of the effective date for addition to the index due to the tracking error it creates. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) identify the index effect as a violation of market efficiency and attribute the abnormal return to price pressure resulting from a downward sloping demand curve for stocks. Beneish and Whaley (1997) report that the price inefficiency in the market evidenced in the index effect is beginning to disappear.
There is clear evidence that the index effect exists and that "risk arbitrageurs" are active in the market buying shares prior to the effective date for their addition to the index. If the price effect is a temporary one created by liquidity problems then the addition of a stock to an index would not be a valid reason for investing in the stock as price will in the long run be determined by fundamentals. The studies cited earlier provide evidence that the price rise is not just a transitory one. In order to understand the index effect a good staring point is to look at the theories that have been advanced on the subject. The first of the five different theories that have been advanced on the index effect is the price pressure hypothesis. If demand for a share increases due to a demand from indexed funds then buyers must expect to pay a higher price. When a share leaves the index the effect will be the opposite. Harris and Gurel (1986) claim their results support this hypothesis. Pruitt and Wei (1989) find that the net increase in ownership by institutions only increased by less than two percent following a share being added to the S&P 500, which only accounted for a small proportion of the increase in trading around such announcements. No more recent data is available to show if this has changed now that indexed funds are increasing in popularity. The price pressure hypothesis would predict that the index effect price change would be a temporary one which is not borne out by most studies on the S&P 500. Vijh (1994) also notes that there are changes in a shares beta corresponding with index changes indicating investors have reassessed the riskiness of shares. This effect would not result from price pressure.
The next theory advanced to explain the index effect is the imperfect substitute hypothesis.
This theory says that the buying of shares by indexers would reduce the number of shares available to be actively traded on the market due to the volume of shares that become locked up in passive funds. The market clearing price for the shares would therefore increase if the long term demand curve is downward sloping and is not affected by the price-insensitive demand behaviour of indexers. Shleifer (1986) argues that the evidence supports the imperfect substitute hypothesis.
Another theory is the liquidity hypothesis. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Edminster Graham and Pirie (1995) find evidence of a permanent increase in trading volume, which is a proxy for liquidity, following a share's inclusion in the S&P 500 in the period prior to October 1989. Similarly, Beneish and Whaley (1996) find evidence of a long term increase in trading volume and a temporary reduction in bid/ask spreads following a share's inclusion in the S&P 500 in the period following October 1989. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) find no evidence of a permanent increase in the value of shares traded following inclusion in the S&P 500 during the same period. Amihud and Mendleson (1986) argue that assets allocated in equilibrium to portfolios with longer expected holding periods such as indexed funds will have higher spreads due to lower liquidity. If the liquidity hypothesis holds true then one would expect a positive and statistically significant increase in price following the announcement of an addition to the index and a negative return following the announcement of a deletion.
The information hypothesis has also been used to explain the index effect. Those who argue in favour of this theory believe that the inclusion of a share in an index has an effect on the information that is available on that share. Following the inclusion of a share in an index it may become the subject of closer scrutiny by analysts and the subject of greater interest by institutions. As closer scrutiny leads to more information and less risk associated with the accuracy of that information, one would expect greater demand and a willingness to pay a higher price due to a lowering of the perceived risk. In addition the announcement itself may have information content about the future prospects of the firm. There is evidence in support of this hypothesis. Jain (1987) observed significant price movements associated with additions and deletions from S&P auxiliary indexes which do not form part of passive fund portfolios. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) observed significant increases on returns from options and bonds of firms being added to the S&P 500. Beneish and Gardner (1995) find that price, trading volume and the quantity of available information are not affected by additions to the DJIA but are decreased for deletions.
The last of the theories that has been used to explain the index effect is the selection criteria effect hypothesis. According to this hypothesis the abnormal returns that occur when shares are added to or removed from an index are not due to the change in the index, but are a result of the underlying fundamentals of the shares themselves. Those that are added to the index will generally have strong historical performance resulting in an increase in their market capitalisation, whereas those removed from the index would tend to have poor price performance. The index effect would just be a reflection of these underlying fundamentals. Edminster, Graham and Pirie (1994) finds that the selection criteria generates just such a bias with additions to the index being characterised by rising prices during a two year preannouncement period. The selection criteria effect is better at explaining the fact that the index effect leads to a permanent increase in price than it is at explaining abnormal returns on the effective date as if the market is efficient then the index change announcement will contain no new information about the share.
Methodology
Information on additions to and deletions from the NZSE 10 and NZSE 40 indexes during the period from the beginning of 1994 until the end of 1998 were obtained from the market information department of the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). Of the initial 120 index changes only 47 remained after screening tests. These are listed in Appendix 1. Shares that did not remain in the index for at least six months were rejected, as were stocks that entered the index within one month of an IPO. Shares that were delisted following the removal from the index were excluded as were those where major events that might have affected pricing occurred in a five day window from two days before to two days after the event. The NZSE gives three weeks notice before any changes to the indices are made, or at least five business days in the case of newly listed companies.
For each index change, closing price and volume data was obtained for 76 days before and 25 days after the effective date. The effective date for the stock to enter or leave the index was defined as day 0. Eventus software, which operates in SAS was then used to calculate the abnormal returns which were then adjusted for movements in the market index.
Results
The results are presented in Tables 1 to 4. Tables 1 and 2 In addition, if the information hypothesis plays a significant role in explaining the index effect for other indices, it is unlikely to play a significant role in additions to and deletions from the NZSE 10 as no significant increase in the volume of information can be expected to occur for shares already present in the NZSE 40. All NZSE 40 shares are well reported and followed by analysts, especially those nearing the threshold for addition to the NZSE 10.
The results for the NZSE 40 show that the market is efficient as far as entries to the index are concerned, and that no obvious opportunity for making speculative profits exists.
Exiting the NZSE 40 has a negative impact on returns in the period between the announcement and the effective date, however as short selling is not available on the NZ sharemarket, and options and futures contracts are not available on these shares, it is difficult to see how a speculative profit can be achieved. The absence of the ability for speculators to profit from these negative abnormal return may account for this inefficiency in the market.
The negative return for exiting shares supports the liquidity, price pressure and information hypotheses. Given the small market capitalisation of shares leaving the NZSE 40, typically around NZ$40 million, the volume of shares sold by the NZSE 40 based indexed funds would have a significant impact on the volumes sold and could be expected to negatively impact on price, although the fact that most of the negative price impact occurs in the period -25 to -2 indicates that the main selling pressure is not from the indexed funds, which lends greater support to the information hypothesis as the lack of support for poorly performing non-NZSE 40 shares would point to not only an information content in the announcement, but it would also be a signal of a future drop off in interest from analysts.
Overall the results show that the NZ sharemarket is more efficient those offshore markets that have been tested for the index effect. This may be due to the relative unimportance of passive funds in the NZ market. A more detailed analysis of the characteristics of individual firms may allow the identification of opportunities, however the prospects of abnormal returns do not look promising. Perhaps the only strategy that suggests itself is that those wishing to continue to hold shares that are going to be deleted from the index sell them as soon as the deletion from the index is announced and re-buy then following the effective date of deletion from the index. 
Appendix 1 NZSE 10 Composition Changes

